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RURAL W O L T  IN SOUTH BFRICA: 1937-1951* 
by 
Baruch Hirson 
The peasant rebellions of the twentieth century 
are no longer simple responses to local problems, 
if indeed they ever were. They are but the 
parochial reactions to major social dislocations, 
set in motion by overwhelming societal change. 
Eric R. Wolf: On Peasant Rebellions 
The three hundred year struggle of the African people to regain their land has altered 
appreciably over the years. Bitter wars were fo-t through the nineteenth century to 
prevent annexation and displacement, and even after the last battles were fo-t there 
were continued revolts against land dispossession or against regulations imposed upon 
the rural population. 
In the twentieth century, the South African peasant (1) struggle did not 
altogether conform to the above quoted extract fmm Eric Wolf's well known essay. The 
revolts were never "simple responses to local problems11 but reactions against labour 
controls, and against nationwide legislation and proclamations. On the other hand, 
they= "reactions to major social dislocations ..lt, and it is the major dislocations 
introduced by the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 that will concern us below. 
To discuss the struggles in the Reserves without reference to events in the 
rest of the country, however, would be artificial. Campaigns in the large towns not 
only had echoes in the rural areas, but were at times superseded by the struggles in 
one or other Reserve. This was a natural consequence of the inter-connection of land 
ancl labour issues and the continuous movement, at least of menfolk, from country to 
town and back. More than this, the reaction'was so often against legislation which 
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aimed to tighten the control on labour, and on its movement, that the same problem 
appeared at both ends of the labour market - in the Reserves and in the towns. 
There were, furthermore, landschaft orgay~izations in at least the large 
towns, which provided a link for men from a particular Reserve (or region) between 
town and "homeff. There are records of some of their activities, at least in secondary 
sources. The Zoutpansberg Cultural Association in Johannesburg and its associated 
Zoutpansberg Balemi [ploughmen] Association in the Northern Transvaal played a 
prominent part in the 1941-44 revolt. The Witzieshoek Vigilance Association in 
Johannesburg and in Harrismith (the closest town to the area) was in close contact 
with the Leihlo la Sechaba (~uardian of the Nation) in the Reserve, and consultations 
took place between these organizations throughout the crisis situation of 1940-1951. 
Much less is known of other similar orgzmizations, although there is sufficient 
evidence to show that they were active and acted as urban llguardiansfl of migratory 
workers. They obviously kept close contact with "home-townf1 developments, and in at 
least one later event (the Bafurutse revolt of 1957) the Association in Johannesburg 
and Pretoria dispatched a bus load of men into the area to intervene in the local 
dispute. (2) But there has been no systematic investigation of these associations, 
and we still know far too little about their activities. 
The Legislation of 1936 
Two laws were passed by Parliament in 1936 - the Natives Land and Trust Act 
and the Representation of Natives Act. This legislation had been discussed for over 
a decade, and the first draft,published in 1926, was directed against African farm 
squatters. Under the proposed legislation of 1926, squatters were to be converted 
into full-time servants for a minimum of 90-180 days every calendar year. The 
legislation was delayed, but in 1929 a draft Native Service Control Registration Bill 
was introduced by the Minister of Justice. Once again, the aim was to force squatters 
to work for a minimum of three months per year. A heavy penalty was to be imposed on 
any male between 18 and 60 years of age who did not render such service. 
When the Bills were finally passed, the fourth (and last) chapter of the 
Natives Land and Trust Act laid d o 6  conditions for controlling labour-tenants and 
for ending squatting. The labour-tenants were to be made to work for 180 days (in 
effect nearly seven calendar months) in any district, after consultations between the 
farmers and the Minister. Squatters were to be registered and then licensed, the 
licensing fees increasing yearly until all squatting was ended within a 30-year period. 
A series of proclamations in December 1937 gave notice that chapter 4 of the 
Act would be applied to the Lydenburg district. Labour-tenants would thenceforth be 
required to work for 180 dws. The reaction of the African population was immediate. 
There were large-scale demonstrations in and around Lydenburg, followed by demands for 
trek-passes (i.e. permits to leave the area). Many left, and Qrdenberg f amers 
demanded that the proclamation be extended to the rest of the Province in order to 
prevent other farmers absorbing the displaced population. 
The reaction of the labour tenants, at the time, made the provision 
unworkable. The Act required that alternative accommodation be available on the Trust 
Landls. And the extension of the proclamation to the rest of the Transvaal would only 
have exacerbated the situation. The proclamation was allowed to lapse and was later 
withdrawn. (3) It was more than a decade before squatters were forcibly removed and 
dumped in open camps inside the Reserves. But by that time large-scale capitalist 
farming had made many labour-tenants "redundant", and had made squatters an 
wencumbrance". 
The attempisto force squatters off the land and to convert labour-tenants 
into farm workers were part of the overall plan to force Africans off the land and 
into the labour market. In 1926, the government aimed to direct the labour force 
primarily into service on the fams. By 1936 the economy of the country was changed 
and there was increasing demand for labour in commerce and industry. As a result a 
third bill was added to the 1936 legislation in the shape of the Native Laws 
Amendment Act, 1937. This was aimed at regulating labour and controlling movement in 
the towns. 
The three "Hertzog Bills" were immediately condemned by African politicians, 
and the proposed disenfranchisement of the 16,000 Cape African voters was the rallying 
point around which a new organization, the All-African Convention, was summoned in 
1935 and again in 1936. (4) 
Without doubting the importance of protecting and of extending the existing 
vote, it seems, in retrospect, that the existing African leadership either misunderstood 
the new Land legislation or they were deceived. Whatever the reason, accounts of the 
deliberations of the AAC in those days do not mention any discussion on the land. A 
few of the comments made by African leaders at the time indicate a serious lack of 
understanding of the plight the peasant would face when the legislation was put into 
effect. D. D. T. Jabavu, first president of the Convention and its nominal head for 
a decade, said: 
The Native Trust & Land Bill is a step in the right 
direction . . . That is the bright side of the proposal. (5) 
The Rev. J. L. Dube, an early leader of the ANC, was reported as attacking the removal 
of the vote, but as swing on the land question: 
. . . they should be glad because one thing every 
Native wanted was much more than the vote - W! 
But land had been promised in the past; but they 
had never got it! How do we know that the 14 
million acres will be given to us? (6) 
Indeed, Dube was correct. The 14 million acres still have not been completely I1given". 
But if they had been "given", apparently Dube would have been llgladll. At least 
moderately "gladw. He could not have realized that all land subsequently "givenI1 to 
the Reserves was already fully settled by Africans - in fact over-populated! 
The same journal also quotes the Rev. A. S. Mtimkulu as saying much the same: 
The locations are overcrowded. The natives are 
greatly pleased with the provision of more land. (7) 
Levi K. E. Sitebe is even more enthusiastic, and writes: 'Ithe principle of the bill is 
to encourage Natives to build themselves agriculturally . . .I1 (a), and, presumably, 
Champion, erstwhile leader of the ICU in Natal, agreed. The above comments, printed 
in his journal, were culled from newspapers, and reports of meetings - and the editor 
obviously concurred. 
Only a detailed survey would unravel the factors that led these men to speak 
this way. Some, no doubt, sought personal gain; others were moved to speak out 
disinterestedly. But motives were of little interest to the peasants. These leaders 
stayed away from the peasants, and were nowhere in evidence when the provisions of the 
Land Act were applied and the peasants rose in revolt. 
The Native Trust in action in the Reserves 
The Africans in the Reserves in 1936 do not seem to have shown much interest 
in the vote, and there are no reports during the next decade that this was a live issue 
in the rural areas. They were completely absorbed in the need to raise food under the 
most WfPicult co the 1936 Act did not make 
farming. W. M. McMillan describes the situation in 1930 as follows: 
The Transvaal, on the whole, knows 
scattered 'locationc type of Rese 
however, there are also two remot 
blocks of Native land - one kno 
in the bush-veld between the Pretoria-Pietersburg 
line and the railway through Igdenberg, the other 
the Sibaga country, the remote and in parts malari 
stricken area towards the Limpopo and the Poftugue 
border in the North-East. Elsewhere the Reserves 
fertile in parts, but natso healthy ... are too 
scattered among European farms, without roads, 
bridges, and railways, to be anythiw much more than 
the home residences of farm and other labourers. (9) 
The land was also over-populated, the terrain was hilly, and through the early thirties 
was dessicated after prolonged droughts. Such lands as were purchased by the Native 
Trust in this area in order to llconsolidatell the Reserves were already densely 
populated. The land itself proved to be rocky and infertile and generally land which 
whites did not want. (16) 
Conditions were already bad, and those who were not forced to leave the land 
and seek work elsewhere eked out a bare living. Ebt ProclaThation 31 of 1939 led to a 
rapid deterioration. This proclamation was gazetted under a provision of the 1936 
Land Act which stipulated that any district could be declared a "betterment area" 
after the Africans had been consulted. In such areas a limit could be placed on stock 
holdings and the extent of land any individual would be allowed to plough. This area 
was initially restricted in many Reserves to 5 morgen (17 acres), and in many instances 
was considerably smaller. 
In Witzieshoek, the land was restricted to 3 morgen per man, and in 
Zoutpansberg the area was more usually 2 morgen. Yet,greviously, the same men mi&t have 
ploughed 20 to 30 morgen iA the Northern Transvaal (ll), and it was estimated that the 
new small strips could not possibly yield half the required mealie (maize) crop under 
optimum conditions (given the farming methods available at the time). 
Nor were these lands allocated on the basis of previous holdings. The 
division in Witzieshoek, for example, was decided by chiefs, indunas or members of the 
Board of Management: those favoured f;riends or compliant followers who received the best 
(ad largest) plots; others were removed from their land and given smaller plots on 
poor soil. (12) 
Alpheus Maliba, unsung hero of rural resistance in the Northern Transvaal, 
and a man of remarkable bravery, leader of the Zoutpansberg Cultural Association in 
Johannesburg, and of the associated Zoutpansberg Balemi Association in the Reserves, 
described the situation in the Northern Transvaal in an interview. Prior to 1936, 
there had been no regulation limiting the area an individual could plot@. After the 
Land Act new tribes were moved into the Reserves, and each family was initially allotted 
4-5 morgen. In 1940, however, the families were all uprooted and moved on to farms 
purchased by the Native Trust from white farmers. This land was hilly and stony and 
often unsuitable for cultivation; in many cases ploughs could not be used. None t 
less, taxpayers were given 2 morgen of land, and non-taxpayers ( L e .  old men, widows, 
and unmarried women) 1% morgen each. In 1941 the land was once again redivided: 
taxp;'ayers got 1% norgen but fion-taxpayers received no land at, all. (13) This, said 
Maliba, was where the trouble began. The peasm-bs, sCarving, harassed, and pushed off 
their l d ,  had until now shorn a remarkable patience. Perhaps they were too patient 
and long suffering. A new element was added in the new Trust Lands. Many of the 
Native Commissioners and agricultural officers were themselves disposses~ed farmers, 
and they saw these appointments as golden means of recouping their lost wealth. They 
were open to bribery when land was allocated, and they resorted to force in handling 
I1hostile elements". Basner is reported as saying in the Senate that the "Northern 
Transvaal was a seething cauldron of discontent" owing to the actions of Emmett, a 
Native Commissioner in the Pietersberg area. (14) 
Accounts of this area, stretching back over the decades, show that the 
population faced disaster after disaster. The region suffered periodic drought or 
disease. Yet no government relief ever came. Other disasters followed inevitably on new 
government regulations, and the population, worn out inthe battle to feed thezselves, 
were moved to revolt when new regulations destroyed any hope of regaining even the I 
tenuous equilibrium they hoped to achieve. l 
In 1937 the Transvaal newspapers carried news of 40,000 writs served in the 
l 
Pietersburg district for non-payment of poll tax. Given an official population in the I 
town and country districts of 194,834, the number of poll tax payers must have been 
just about that number! These came after an extended period of agricultural disasters. 
An article in Spmk in 1937 describes the situation (15): After extended droughts in I 
1932-33, the Africans in the area had need of urgent assistance, but all pleas for the 
release of maize at subsidized ex-port prices were rejected by the government. Few 
could afford to buy this staple at inflationary local prices - and still fewer could 
find the cash for the annual tax. The drought was followed by the death of many of 
the weakened cattle who ate fodder contaminated with anti-locust poison. And these 
depleted herds faced culling under the betterment scheme! The population was 
destitute, and in many cases were four years in arrears with tax payment. It was 
estimated that paying these taxes in 1937 together with the inevitable court fine l 
would be equivalent to one year's pay! The Spark article concluded that the issuing 
of writs and the attachment of property could have only one effect. More men would be 
driven off the ~ E U I  onto the labour market. i 
The enforcement of regulations under the betterment scheme made it 
impossible for many of the peasants to continue working the land. Ploughs, where 
these existed, had to be abandoned on very stony plots, or on strips where it was 
forbidden to uproot bushes or trees. There were new tight controls on tax payments 
after the 1937 writs, and late payment led to a fine of 2s .6d. At that time this was 
equivalent to half a month's wages for local farm labourers. 
There was bound to be an explosion, and it seems to have occurred first in 
the Louis Trichardt district. In this region, as elsewhere, the land allocation had 
been restricted to 2 morgen, and the local population, driven beyond endurance, pulled 
out the survey pins. For this some 60-80 were arrested and taken to Louis Trichardt to 
be tried. Ss in Wdenburg, the reaction was immediate. It is estimated that some 
6-10,000 Africans marched on the courts and that only the withdrawal of the charge 
stopped bloodshed. The Secretary of Native Affairs quashed the charges and the 
peasants went home. 
The incident has a sinister aspect that needs comment. There was no report 
of the matter in the South African press, and nobody outside the district was aware of 
the event. 
Basner, called into the Pietersburg district at the end of 1941 to defend 
80 men accused of ploughing more than the regulation 5 morgen, was informed about the 
maslch for the first time. He, in turn, was able to secure some publiciQ only after 
he entered the Senate and raised the matter at a debate in 1943. (16) Throughout the 
war years local disturbances remained unreported to an even greater extent than usual. 
African complaints were not "newswo~thyl', and under war conditions an additional self- 
censorship prevented such events being reported or printed. Many other disturbances, 
of which only stray and circumstantial clues are available, were not reported. None 
the less, there prove to be many stories behind the men who were banished or 
arrested at the time (17) which will give us new insi&t into the nature of the 
struggles in the 1940s. 
From the time of the march through to the end of 1944, the Northern Transvaal 
was in a state of near rebellion. It was a period of protest, and of defiance; of 
meetings and of action. There was activity in the Reserves, action in the rural towns, 
and an active group in Johannesburg that supported and helped organize the protest 
movement. It was also a period of intense repression. The police were rushed into 
the area and men were arrested, detained and charged. There are also indications of 
I even greater violence, but only as hearsay or as %our. According to the Guardian of 
1 
l 16.12.43: 
It is rumoured that bombers at Pietersburg Aerodrome 
were told to stand by in case of trouble. 
1 One hundred Africans were arrested. l 
1 As late as March 1945, Jams Z. Ndatyulwa, chief organizer of the African Democratic 
Party (ADP), and president of the Transvaal Advisory Boards Association, was quoted 
as referring to a series of repressive measures in the Transvaal. He linked these 
l 
with : 
the disturbances at Pietersburg where the police, 
military and aeroplanes were used to intimidate 
people . . . 
Ndatyulwa was warned by the magistrate of Klerksdorp that he would be interned if he 
did not stop his revolutionary and inciting attitude. (18) Finally, Basner, who was 
closely associated with the ADP, maintains that: 
l 
l 
I I was involved with scores of struggles on Trust I 
farms and tribal locations about the operation of 
the Native Trust & Land Act, 1936. Cattle calling, 
1 squatters, ploughing allotments, chiefly powers versus 
trust officials were the main issues. Most of the 
I struggles were in the Northern Transvaal, and some were 
even fiercer and crueller than Witzieshoek, but 
l unreported because only Africans and no police were 
I killed. I received constant reports of bombed villages 
and had no reason to doubt the reports. '(19) 
l The Struggle Intensifies 
l The progress of the struggle in the Transvaal depended on the involvement of 
men and women in the Reserve areas and in Johannesburg. 
The peasant population was largely united. The clashes between chiefs and 
their people - which was to come to the fore in other areas - are not obvious from 
the available evidence. Vella Pillw, at that time a member of the CPSA, was asked 
1 to drive Maliba through the Pietersburg area. In a recent interview he stated that 
Malibals strength lay in his ability to speak in the local idiom, and also in his 
accessibility to the chiefs. On entering a reserve he first visited the chief, and 
often this ended with the slaughtering of an ox. Thereafter, he would meet the peasants, 
and there was never any hint of a conflict of interests between the chiefs or indunas 
(headmen) and their people. (20) 
The unity of the population, and the determination to oppose the new 
regulations is illustrated in one of the news items of the time. On 20th November 
1941, the Guardian reported Paramount Chief Mpefa as saying at Louis Trichardt: 
Arrest me! - but let my people go! 
What they are doing is right. I am prepared 
to suffer for them. 
The Africans wer2 not prepared to accept the new land divisions and responded 
readily to Pkilibats message. 2,000 peasants met on 20th October 1941 near Piesanghoek 
and declared, after a meeting addressed by him: 
We, people of the Northern Transvaal, have come 
together to save owselves from starvation. We 
now solemnly decide that each and everyone of 
us will plough the land which we were accustomed 
to plough in past years. We will remove the 
sticks which the Government has set up, a.nd plough 
our own land. Any person who breaks this 
resolution is an enemy of the people. 
We will send a copy of this resolution to the 
Native Commissioner and to the Minister for 
Native Affairs in Pretoria. (21) 
This was not an idle threat. Twenty peasants subsequently ploughed their original land 
(as distinct from the land that had been allocated to them in the redivision). For 
Maliba it meant inevitable arrest, and for the years to come he seemed to leave one 
prison only in order to face fresh restrictions, until eventually forced to leave the 
area or face deportation in June 1944. 
Alpheus Maliba never stopped in any one district for long. There was far 
too much to be done, and he was conscious of the need to weld the people together and 
to extend and widen the struggle. In Louis Trichardt he formed a General Workers Union 
which was associated with the Balemi Association. Inevitably, there was a strike 
(~ctober 1943) at Nessina and a clash in which troops were called in. They held the 
workers at gun point and confronted them with the choice of returning to work or being 
arrested. Seventy-five were imprisoned but the remainder either returned to work or 
left the town. Their demand had been for an extra 6d. (3p.) per da;y, and they had 
rejected the offer of 2d. made by the Native Commissioner. (22) Eighty men were 
charged and received sentences which ranged from three weeks to three months plus a 
£9 fine. 
Maliba was indefatigable, asld was back in Louis Trichardt the following April 
when he organized a May Day procession. He had failed to get permission for the 
demonstration and was once again charged. At this stage he went underground and was, 
according to H. Basner, hunted for months. 
None of this could have happened without the Zoutpansberg Cultural Association 
centred in Johannesburg. It had close links with the Communist Party, and had offices 
at Progress Buildings, where the CPSA offices were situated. Maliba was obviously its 
most outstanding publicist and its main activist, but he could not have achieved as much 
as he did without his committee. The ZCA advised and supported the peasants, and 
provided leadership for the struggle. It took up the immediate complaints in the 
Reserves: through the ZBA, and it reached out towards the workers in the rural towns. 
Nor did it neglect the teachers in the district towns, and the ZBA had the full backing 
of M. K. Molepo, president of the Transvaal African Teachers Association (TATA) and 
resident in the Northern Transvaal. 
Through the ZB11, the entire population was brought into the struggle. The 
women at Piesanghoek, all members of the ZBA, marched to the Native Commissioner in 
protest against being forced to do men's work,in December 1943. (23) Undoubtedly, 
there would have been resistance without the ZCA-ZBA, but it would have been reduced 
to isolated action arnd crushed. Organization in town, backed by the CPSA newspapers, 
transport to Johannesburg and back for men like Maliba, and active support from at 
least some sections in the CPSA, were crucial for the continued resistance in the area. 
In the early years of the war there was little doubt that Maliba was the 
acknowledged leader of the area, that the ZBA had the support of the population, and 
that the CPSA had established a political base in the countryside. By 1945 the 
struggle had been suppressed, the organization was shattered, and the Communist 
presence was all but extinguished. The reasons for this do not appear to have been 
discussed in any account of CPSA activity, and the ZCA has not been described in any 
of that partyfs recent publications. In view of this dearth of information, it is 
possible only to offer some tentative suggestions for the collapse of the war-time 
I 
I organization. 
A major factor, undoubtedly, was; police action. The harassment of the 
l population, and the leader~ in particular, helped destroy formal organization, and eventually silenced the discontented. But there were other factors - and these 
contributed to the eventual defeat of the ZBA and its associated organizations. 
In the early 1940s members of the Johannesburg district of the CPSA apparently 
I 
I debated the feasibility of concentrating activity on work in the countryside. There are 
1 no available documents on the positions taken by disputants inside the CPSA, but it seems 
that the majority opinion was that such activity would divert attention from work amongst 
urban workers. The debates were acrimonious and some members were either expelled or left 
the party. (24) On the other hand, the programme published by Maliba (see appendix) does 
not indicate that members of the CPSA spent much time in working out a strategy for the 
peasants. None the less, Alpheus Maliba and the ZCA in Johannesb~rg did get support; 
but, in view of the meagre resources in the CP at the time, this was not extensive, 
particularly after 1941 when party members joined the armed forces, and others were 
deeply involved in supporting military projects. 
There was another factor which also played a part in ending militant action. 
The CPSA, and indeed all left organizations, had turned to the law in defence of its 
members against arbitrary officialdom, and against repressive legislation. Working as 
they did inside a strictly legal framework, this was an integral part of the political 
approach of most organizations. As long as such channels could be used, no party could 
easily forego the opportunity to argue its case before the courts. None the less, there 
was an excessive reliance on the use of the law, and Maliba had been 'trained in this 
tradition. Basner, intent on building a new following after resigninghom the CPSA, and 
either campaigning for (or elected as member of) the Senate for the Transvaal and Orange 
Free State, offered his legal services. The legalism of the CPSA was reinforced by Basner, 
by M. K. Molepo (~asnerts translator, and member of the ADP), and by Self Mampuru (leading 
member- of the ADP and African adviser to the Society of. the Friends of Africa). They 
advised, they spoke, and they produced memoranda (25); but they did not encourage direct 
action. 
Militant mass action did not cease, but the attentions of the people were 
increasingly turned to legal processes, and to the urgent need to raise funds for 
lawyers! fees. Reports printed in the Guardian in 1944 were about court cases rather 
than of direct action: cases against the deportation of Molepo, cases against Maliba, 
and cases against local militants. Few, if any, were successful, aYld at best only 
delved deportations - and the population was left to find the money. (26) 
The ZBA had never had a formal organizational structure, and in the aftermath 
of the legal cases and the enforcement of the division of land it just ceased to exist. 
Maliba, forced out of the region by the police, could not switch his activities to work 
in Johannesburg with any great success. He was unable to use his considerable talents 
in Johaanesburg, and ceased to play an active role in the few years before the CPSA was 
dissolved. (27) 
Witzieshoek 
The events of Witzieshoek have been more widely discussed than these in the 
Northern Transvaal, owing to the publication of the government's Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Witzieshoek Native Reserve (UG 26/51) 
and the availability of the judgement in the trial that followed the shootings in 
1950. Because two policemen were killed - the 14 Africans shot dead received less 
publicity - there was widespread press coverage of the final confrontation, and the 
name Witzieshoek is joined to that of Bulhoek, Marasbastad, and Sharpville in the 
saga of resistance to tyranny. 
The sequence of events in Witzieshoek was not dissimilar to that in the 
Zoutpansberg: there was the same redistribution of lard, and the reduction of area 
that could be ploughed; the same form of resistance and co-operation with a parallel 
urban organization; and the same confrontations with police. In addition, there 
was repeated culling of cattle, and this exacerbated the peasants' bitterness. 
The leadership was, however, different, and. brave as the leader, Paulus 
Howell Mopeli, was, his status as a sub-chief and relation of Chief Charles Mopeli 
added an extra dimension to the local struggle. His local organization, the Leihlo 
la Sechaba, which led the campaign against the Board of Management of the Reserve, 
also campaigned against Chief Charles. They were both descendants of Mosheshae, 
and Paulus'sfight against Charles was complex. On the one hand, it involved a 
struggle against the Betterment Scheme, and at the same time it was concerned with 
claims to the chieftainship. His bravery and his sincerity in opposing the 
government administration are not in doubt - but there were also personal issues 
which intruded. Paulus was fighting for his own privileged position, his own heras 
of cattle - and his leadership could not be as disinterested as that of Maliba, in 
the north. (28) 
The Betterment scheme was applied from early 1939 in Witzieshoek, when 
grazing controls, fencing, and removal of population from grazing areas were enforced. 
Later the same year, regulations were promulgated to limit control and improve the 
herds of livestock, and the first estimate made of the maximum stock "units" the 
Reserve could carry. (29) The first cull was ordered in February 1942, and the 
Regent of the Bathlokoa (one of the smaller tribes in the area) refused to co-operate, 
and was fined. In the years to come the carrying load of stock in the Reserves was 
re-estimated and further culls were ordered. Opposition mounted and Paulusfs following 
increased. The culling had become intolerable, and, as one speaker in Witzieshoek 
said in 1947, 
In 1942 it was announced that only inferior cattle 
would be culled. New stock was being culled in 
order to reduce it. The tribe had been deceived. 
It did not accept the limitation of the stock. (30) 
The arbitrariness of the culling process was confirmed by G. A. Brand, a white 
storekeeper of the region. In evidence in 1951 he said: 
Much of the soil conservation work in the area was 
a scandal and a waste of money. The culling of 
stock was carried out haphazardly and many of the 
poorer Natives were prejudiced by it . . . (31) 
Altho- the Commission of Ehquiry outlined the history of culling and the 
reactions of the peasants to the redustion of stock, they were silent on the issue of 
land reallocation. Edwin Mofutsanyana had, however, drawn attention to this problem 
in May 1945. (32) As in Zoutpansberg, the size of land holdings was reduced to 2-3 
rnorgen, but widows received only 1 morgen, independent of the number of their 
dependants. As stated above, the allocation in this area was organized by the Chief 
and his indunas, and they took the best and largest lands. This also made the 
position in Witzieshoek very different from that in the Zoutpansberg. 
It was the reallocation of land, together with fencing and control of 
grazing that led to the revival in 1940 of the Witzieshoek Vililance Association. 
This proved to be a less powerful organization than the ZCA, mainly because the 
m a i n  body of migrant workers were in Harrismith, which was a small village with no 
tradition of workers! struggle. The Witzieshoek migrants in Johannesburg were few in 
number, and this might have been a restraining factor on Mofutsanyana, who came from 
the region. There is also the possibility that Mofutsanyama, leading member of the 
CPSA in the Transvaal and one time editor of 33kululek0, was bound by the earlier 
decision of his party to concentrate on urban activities. Whatever the reason, his 
description of the people as Itterribly backward in this reserve [~itzieshoek]" would 
have been alien to Maliba and to Mopeli. 
The inner tribal struggle was far from simple. The Chief and his headmen 
did have the largest herds and they were no more reconciled to culling than the rest 
of the population. On the other had, they participated in the allocation of land, 
and had to work with the administration. In the end they chose to side with the 
administration - where their class interests were best represented. Initially, however, 
Chief Charles sent a delegation to Cape Town to see Basner (then a senator) to secure 
his intercession with the Minister. The delegation was chosen by the assembled tribe 
and was led by Paulus Mopeli. 
The delegation did see Basner, and on return announced that the Minister 
would not change policy in the Reserve, and that Basner had advised them to cut the 
fences in order to bring their complaints to public notice. The Commission of Enquiry 
was told that Basner had not suggested the use of sabotage, and that the delegation had 
used his name in order to back their own plan. The population split on the issue: the 
Chief sided with the administration, but large sections of the population joined the 
three envoys in their plan to nullify the betterment scheme. 
There were several outbreaks of fire and three plantations were partially 
destroyed. Fences were destroyed,ad cattle impounded for being in prohibited areas 
were rescued by peasants. Government attempts to cull the herds in Pebrmry 1950 were 
stopped by "active and passivelI resistance. The few men who allowed their herds to be 
culled did so reluctantly. In March there was a mass handing in of land certificates 
and stock cards to the administration, and the Native T m t  was asked to remove the 
fences, the stud bulls, and all the belongings of the administration. 
Throughout the period of disturbance the Leihlo la Sechaba called for a 
Commission of Encluiw,.but this was refused. OllLv continued clashes with the 
administration, increased sabotage, and threats tb workers engaged in construction work 
forced the Government to set up a Commission to enquire into events in the district. 
The situation, however, deteriorated beyond repair. The split inside the 
tribe widened and the two factions were irreconcilable. Chief Charles and some of the 
headmen depended on the protection of the magistrate of Harrismith and the local 
administration. Internal skirmishes between the factions became a permanent feature of 
Reserve life, and the Chiefts men preventedmembers of the opposition from ploughing. 
The Commission was seen by the aggrieved peasants to be unsympathetic to 
their demands - as indeed it was bound to be. The peasants first demonstrated outside 
the Court, and then the 1,300-strong crowd withdrew to the Reserve. They resisted the 
demand that they appear to give evidence, and while the Enquiry was adjourned sought 
assistance from the Vigilance Association. Paulus travelled to Johannesburg and 
discussed the peoplefs complaints with Mofutswana and James Mojoro (one-time organizer 
of the African Mine Workers[ union). Both these men had travelled to the Free State 
to give evidence for the Vigilance Association before the Commission, and were in close 
touch with Reserve affairs. Paulus also met Dr Dadoo and other members of the CPSA. 
This was seen by the Commission as part of a "conspiracy" by Paulus to oust Charles and 
assume, in some indescribable way, the lffunctions of the Native Commissioner". 
During the adjournment of the Enquiry all meetings of more than three persons 
were declared illegal in the Reserve, under proclamation No. 31 of 1945. An act of 
defiance of this prohibition led to a clash with armed police and the inevitable shooting. 
The crowd refused to disperse, and sang hymns, said one witness to the events, when 
sten guns were discharged into the assembled crowd. (34) The estimate of fatalities 
indicatedthat 14 were dead and just fewer than 100 injured. Search planes and 
columns of police scoured the countryside and arrested everyone found in the 
surrounding area. Eventually 75 were brought to trial, and. sent to prison for periods 
ranging from three months to five years. Witzieshoek was quelled,, another labour 
force controlled, and chief Charles's xule was upheld. 
"Bettermentff becomes llRehabilitationll 
I 
In 1945, D. L. Smit, Secretary for Native Affairs, set out plans for the 
llrehabilitationll of the Reserves at special sessions of Native General Councils in 
the Transkei and Ciskei. The scheme, as Smit explained, involved the demarcation of 
sites inside the Reserves for cultivation, for rotational grazing, and for land to 
! lie fallow. At the sane time rural villages were to be established for the families 
of Africans regularly employed in industry. No stock would be allowed in these 
villages but vegetable plots would, where possible, be made available. All surplus 
population would be settled in these villages, or removed to sites where rural 
villages could be established. In exchang-e, the Government would provide 
, 
afforestation of the Reserves, the erection of fencing and soil conservation, stock 
limitation and preservation of water supplies. In reporting this, Govan Mbeki 
concluded: 
'Phis means that the government has definitely set 
its face against the urbanisation of the African 
workers, that it is determined ... to maintain its 
policy of migratory labour . . . (35) 
The Transkei and Ciskei Councils rejected the scheme, saying that the deterioration of 
the land was due to the big increase of population without a corresponding increase in 
stock to supply the needs of the people. 
Yet six months later the Ciskeian General Council accepted the scheme by 18 
votes to 3. The Guardian report of 11th October says,inexplicably: 
No doubt the plain facts given by the Secretary for 
Native Affairs [by now this was 'G.  ears] had a lot 
to do with the reversed decision. Pointing out the 
barren nature of the Ciskei as a result of bad 
farming, M r  Mears warned the Bunga (or council) that 
even when all the available land had been acquired by 
the Native Trust there would still not be enough 
arable land available in South Africa for the African 
people. Consequently they must regenerate what land 
they had through proper faxming practice. 
This reversal took place after considerable pressure had been put on many of the Chiefs 
who sat on the Council. But it also took place while the people were under considerable 
duress. A catastrophic drought had ravaged all South Africa (with the exception of the 
Western cape). Every Reserve was affected, and up to 40% of the cattle had died, 
particularly in the Ciskei, Northern Transvaal and Zululand. Malnutrition had become 
endemic in these areas. (36) 
There was an immediate reaction, and local committees emerged to lead a 
struggle against the new schene throughout the Eastern Cape. There was even talk of 
taking up arms in the Transkei at Mt Ayliff, and a secret movement, the K o w  (37), 
was formed with the object of replacing the local chief. It was said that he had 
betrayed the people by accepting the scheme, and furthermore that the incumbent owed 
his position to an irregular election. The K o w  then, as later in the 1960 Pondo 
revolt, met in the hills. (38) 
The Konm was affiliated to the All-African Convention (M) in 1948, and 
two representatives to the December conference reported on the activities of their 
group. A further report was given of an attack on surveyors in the Glen Grey district 
which led to a Court appearance of the "ringleaders". The entire village arrived at 
Court to answer the case, and the charge was eventually dropped. 
Throvghout the region there were protests: protests against the use of 
l government branding of cattle in Peddie, against culling, and against "-1 villagesn. 
I People were arrested and "peoplels committeest1 were formed to organize their defence, 
and there were threats of a resort to arms to protect the cattle. 
l There was also resistance to the Rehabilitation Scheme in the towns. Much 
1 of this came from the ranks of the All-African Convention, and Tabata, its leading 1 theoretician at the time, toured the Eastern Cape Reserves, campaigning against the 
Scheme. He was arrested as a result of his agitation, and local teachers affiliated 
l 
l to the AAC through the Cape African Teachers1 Association carried on the propaganda j campaign. (39) 
There were also other signs of organized protest groups, as indicated by a 
llmanifestoll produced by migratory workers in Port Elizabeth and East London, and sent 
to the Native Representatives in Parliament. The document supported the anti- 
Rehabilitation campaign in the Transkei and listed as rsasons for opposing the scheme: 
the shortage of land, the failure of the Native Trust to buy land, the pulling down of 
kraals, and the limiting of essential stock. They conclude: 
The scheme seems to be another Cattle Killing 
Episode modernised. 
The scheme is designed to impoverish, suppress 
the economic and social growth of the African in 
the Native Reserves. It is a means of preserving 
white superiority ... 
For these and many reasons which we cannot at 
present think out clearly we complain of the unjust 
treatment meted out by our rulers under the cloak of 
Divine Trusteeship. (40) 
Their modesty was hardly necessary. They had thought the matter out more clearly than 
the Native Representatives (who supported the Rehabilitation Scheme for "scientific 
agriculturalt1 reasons) and many of their leaders. 
Reports from the Eastern Cape in the early 1950s were fragmentary, and from 
the rest of the country the black-out was almost complete. Occasionally the silence 
would be broken and the Guardian would print an account of resistance to culling, and 
more rarely the Torch, organ of the Non-Eumpean Unity Movement (which included the 
AAc) printed reports of struggles in the countryside. I have included some of these 
reports below, even though it m w  give the impression of "random jottings1'. M y  
further research will bring to li&t some of the struggles which were never reported 
(even in the opposition press of the time), and provide a better understanding of m a l  
resistance. 
On 11th January and 8th March 1951 there was news of some resistance and much 
protest in Thaba NIchu against culling. Men were arrested and held under proclamations 
293 of 1950 and 32-33 of 1951. 
For over six months there was also a bitter campaign at Nqutu in northern 
Natal. On 18th Januny 1951 six thousand peasants told the Native Cornmissioner that 
they would resist culling. The resistance spread till it embraced all stock owners. 
By June leading tribesmen were arrested and fined, but the people were not intimidated. 
For the first time in the history of this resistance the African National 
Congress played an active role. The Congress Youth League (CYL) declared its full 
support for the people of Nqutu, but a meeting called by them in the district was 
banned. The struggle continued throq3-1 October as culling was opposed and the 
reduction of land allotm?nts resisted. Officials who came to allocate reduced lots 
were threatened with violence and left. 
In the middle of the campaign famine again left the population without food, 
and few could afford to buy maize, which was sold at £2 per bag. (42) 
In 1951 the Government announced. its plans to implement Bantu Authorities 
in the Reserves, and a new phase of the struggle was about to unfold. The older 
struggle against culling and the reduction of plots never came to an end. The 
campaigns, often conducted in isolation (even when news was available), merged into 
the struggles against the new plans for the Reserves - and these in turn were combined 
with resistance against womenvs passes, closer settlement schemes, and so on. The 
campaigns of the late 1950s will be described elsewhere. 
Conclusion 
The struggles in the Pietersburg area and Witzieshoek, as well as those 
which emerged in other Reserves after 1945, were all sparked off by the promulgation 
of flbettermentll or ltrehabilitationll schemes. These were, however, measures which only 
exacerbated intolerable living conditions. The land could not provide a living for 
most of the peasants, and in fact was not meant to. W. Gemmill, one time general 
manager of the Chamber of Mines, a3ld later head of the mines recruiting agency, Wanela 
(witwatersrand Native Labour ~ssociation) , speaking of the Reserves, is reported as 
saying: 
The improvement of the productivity in the Reserves 
should be compulsory and land should be allocated on 
the basis of providiw a partial liviilg, not a full 
living. The migrant labour system ... was a good one 
and should be continued. (42) (my stress) 
Other commentators were perhaps cruder in the way they spoke of the Reserves. As far 
back as 1916, Free State farmers told the Native Land Commission: 
Witzieshoek is not too full yet. The natives are 
quite content to live and remain there, and will not 
come out Bo work. (43) 
Or, as another witness put it: 
If Witzieshoek had a larger population of course 
we would have more servants. (44) 
In 1913 the population was approximately 5,000, and by 1940 was in the 
region of 10,000. More men did go out to work, but the demand had also increased, 
and from all sections of the economy there was a demand for still more labour. The 
condition of the Reserves had deteriorated still further, and. there were members of 
the administration who realized that some improvement was necessary in order to reduce 
the hi& infant mortality and the general debilitation of the population. The need to 
make some improvement ("to provide a partial living", as M r  Gemmill suggested), 
together with the need to force more men into the labour market, were combined in the 
bettement schemes. As such, the problem affected those who clung desperately to the 
land as well as the migrants who saw their dependants reduced to ever more desperate 
straits. The men in the towns joined with kin in the Reserves to combat the new 
division and redivision of the land; they combined their forces in opposing the 
culling of cattle. 
However much the rural and migrant populations were in accord - and men bid 
rush back to their home areas in time of stress - the focus of the struggle was in the 
countryside. It was the men and women who were called on to produce the cattle for 
culling, or to accept reduced plots, who had to take action. In Witzieshoek the 
growing gulf between the large cattle holders and those with tiny herds, coupled with 
rivalry for the chieftainship, introduced an internal fight that divided the forces. 
This was avoided in the Transvaal because the gulf had not yet grown to such 
l dimensions. The nature of: the land, plus the long series of recurrent droughts, had 
I hit every section of the village commity. The area was also fortunate in finding a 
leader of Maliba" calibre, and he was more than usually aware of the need to maintain 
village solidarity. He was also fully aware of the need to c-ordinate the struggle 
on the land with that of the workers in the rural towns. 
l 
I Yet in the final analysis it would seem that there was little that the 
l organizations could achieve. The problem lay not in culling, or redivision, or the 
I 5 morgen M e ,  but the Land Act itself. To break the system of land apportionment would 
I require a liberation movement which did not exist in the early 1940s, and had barely 
1 begun to organize in 1950. It required a movement which would send its organizers out into the countryside - with a programme of action and the means to organize the 1 peasantry. It would also require an organization that had set itself the task of 
changing the system of land holding. 
I Maliba and his co-workers in Pietersberg, Paulus Mopeli and his collaborators 
1 in Wi.l;zieshoek, and those who worked in the same direction in other Reserves, could not 
stand idly by waiting for such a movement to appeas. They reacted as they had to in 
l the situation - and their struggles were long and pro-tracted and inevitably crushed. 
I 
In one sense their struggle proved to be tragic. Their courage and I 
resourcefulness camat be doubted. There were even some who recognized it at the time. 
I But the liberation movement did not, or could not, learn from these men and women. 
l They were unable to build the lessons of the rural struggle into their organization 
i 
I and were consequently unab.Le to respond in time to the sural struggles when they burst 
I into the open again in the late 1950s. The initiative taken by the Durban ANC Youth 
l League in Hqutu was not often repeated, and even in this case there is little evidence 
j from subsequent programmatic statements that the liberation movement had a programme to offer the peasants. The AAC offered words but little action; the other movements 
were too absorbed in their urban work to seize the initiative until the 1960 Pondo 
, 
revolt. The reborn K o w  -movement produced the fiercest resistance. Born in 
I resistance to the llrehabilitation schemel1, tempered in the fight against small 
allotments and cattle-culling, it led the fight against Bantu. Authorities and called l 
1 for armed insurrection. That story has still to be told. 
i 
Notes 
(1) I have used the word "peasant" as a loose designation for describing the rural 
population. They are, in the period under description, not easy to designate. 
Some were migratory labourers at home to rest; some were subsistence farmers, 
who produced little for the cash-market; some had large herds of (possibly 
nscrubn) cattle, others had no stock at all; and many were landless. The 
composition varied from region to region. 
(2) The fullest available account of this action is in Charles Hooper, Brief 
Authority (~ollins , 1960), passim. 
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contentious account by I. B. Tabata, The Awakeniw of a People (~ohannesburg, 
People! S Press, 1960), and an account of the proceedings of the f i r s t  conferences 
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the Trust Lands (personal communication), 
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17th April 1945. 
Letter t o  the author, 27th May 1975. An e a r l i e r  version of t h i s  l e t t e r  was not 
meant f o r  publication, and. is  a l te red  here to  conform with EQimm Basnerfs more 
considered version. Mary KLopper, whose family l ived i n  the area, a lso reports 
having heard these reports a t  the time. I have still  not been able t o  get any 
confirmation f ron  members of the CPSA who knew Maliba. Some of those interviewed, 
however, were away on act ive service i n  North Africa during the period under 
discussion. G. C a r r ,  who ta@t i n  the Pietersberg area, s t a t e s  t ha t  he was aware 
or" troop movements in  Louis Trichardt, and records tha t  the peasants were too a f r a id  
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indebted t o  G.G., a member of the CPSA at the time, f o r  information on t h i s  subject. 
Mamparu and Basner drew up a report on events in the Northern Transvaal, drawing 
attention to 200 people arrested for violating the restrictions on ploughing 
more than 5 morgen. This was supplied to members of the Native Representative 
Council in December 1942, and was the basis of a resolution put to the NRC. 
(~alf-yearly report of the Society of Friends of Africa, JUG-~ecember 1943.) 
The minutes of that NRC meeting (UG 10, 1943) contain no reference to this 
report, or to events in the Northern Transvaal. Once again, it wocld seem, news 
about events in the north was being suppressed. 
Thus a letter to the Guardian of 17th May 1945 appeals to the readers for £136 
to p w  the balance of an account of £275. Letters were also sent to Dr A. B. Xuma, 
President of the ANC. 
His death in a prison cell in Pretoria, 1967, is noted in H. J. & R. E. Simons, 
Colour and Class in South Africa, 1850-1950 (penguin, 1969), p. 538. But there 
is no indication of why he was arrested. There is no record of his having been 
politically active after 1950. 
H. Basner, who knew and defended both men, first drew my attention to the 
difference between Mopeli and Maliba, and the fact that one was fighting for his 
position inside the chiefly hierarcm while the other was the leader of landless 
people. 
A stock unit consisted of one head of cattle, or an equivalent number of goats 
or sheep. 
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(~ohannesburg, February 1976). 
E. Mofutsanyana, op. cit. 
Commission of Enquiry. Much of the' description of the events that follow is 
taken from the Commission report. 
Stuwlnan Kele, employee of the Native Trust, giving evidence at the trial, as 
quoted in the Guardian, 25th January 1951. 
Guardian, 12th April 1945. 
See, for example, the report of the Society of Friends of Africa-for 1945. 
The report also said that conditions in the Reserves must lead to a serious 
reduction of "South Africa's greatest asset" - Native labour. 
The appearance of the K o m  at the AAC Conference as early as 1948 (and not in 
1960, as suggested by Govan Mbeki, South Africa. The Peasants Revolt, p. 120) 
throws doubt on the suggestion that- -%his was an abbreviation of llCongressl'. 
The information on the Transkei is obtained from the Minutes of the Conference 
of the All African Convention, December 1948, and I. B. Tabata, The Awakenirq 
of a People (People's Press, 1950), pp. 89-92. 
Tabata, op. cit., passim. 
Handwritten Memorandum headed "The Anti-Rehabilitation Government Scheme 
Committee for the Transkeian Territories Manifesto", signed by Hamilton G. Kraai, 
M. P. Nguloshe, and W. Jinga. Dated 14th October 1947 (~allinger papers, Cape 
TOW). 
Reports appear in the Guardian, 13th March 1952, and after this paper was 
suppressed by its successors,'Clarian and People's World. After October, with 
reports of the drought and starvation in the area, the reports cease. 
Quoted by Dr A. B. Xuma inlWemoran$um to Native &aws~~Commission of Enquiry" 
(W. Ballinger papers - Cape Town). Dr Xuma, unfortunately, does not give his 
source, and does not date the quotation. 
Quoted in S. Moroney, op. cit., p. 3. 
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Appendix 
Alpheas Maliba wrote a pmphlet c .l938 on the Venda people (op. cit .) , and 
the Johannesburg District Committee of the Communist Party published it as a party 
pamphlet. The documents conclude with a seven-point llCommunist programme" for the 
Northern Transvaal. 
The seven points are generally related to land questions, although (2) 
demands that the mines become the property of the people. There is considerable 
justification in including this matter, although it would have been more appropriate 
if the issue had been linked to the parallel problem of migratory labour. 
Points 3, 4 and 5 call for an end of poll tax, dog tax, dipping and grazing 
fees; for the full franchise and an end to the power of Native Commissioners and the 
Native Affairs Department; and for the government to provide agricultural school and 
modern implements for farmers. 
These points could have appeared in any programme and were by no means 
revolutionary. Nor was the seventh point, which called on all tribes to unify in the 
fight against oppression. 
The two points that refer to land. allocation and use were: 
l 
1. The claim that the land must be taken from the rich 
and, together with Crown land, returned to the people. 
6. "Individual land tenure must take the place of tribal 
tenure so that competition will be encouraged, and the 
faxm workers will have the incentive to improve their 
land." 
It would be instructive to know whether this last point was in fact endorsed 
by the CPSA, or whether Maliba was given a free hand in issuing the publication. 
Although the issue is in one sense academic, because there was no possibility of 
implementing the programme at the time, more information about this pamphlet would give 
us further insight into the attitude of the party majority on the land issue. If the 
prognume had the full backing of the CPSA, it would indicate a remarkable phase in 
party thinking. The belief that private property was necessary so that consequent 
competition would provide an incentive to land improvement seems contrary to all the 
tenets of Marxism, and in the light of the experience at Glen Grey is incomprehensible. 
If, on the other hand, the programme was not adopted by the CPSA, its l 
appearance in a party publication would indicate that there was a lack of serious 
thought on the needs of the peasants in 1938. 
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